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Abstract
The diffusion of Covid-19 has called governments and public health au-
thorities to interventions aiming at limiting new infections and containing
the expected number of critical cases and deaths. Most of these measures
rely on the compliance of people, who are asked to reduce their social con-
tacts to a minimum. In this note we argue that individuals’ adherence to
prescriptions and reduction of social activity may not be efficacious if not
implemented robustly on all social groups, especially on those character-
ized by intense mixing patterns. Actually, it is possible that, if those who
have many contacts have reduced them proportionally less than those who
have few, then the effect of a policy could have backfired: the disease has
taken more time to die out, up to the point that it has become endemic.
In a nutshell, unless one gets everyone to act, and specifically those who
have more contacts, a policy may even be counterproductive.
Introduction
As social scientists, we use epidemic models to mimic the diffusion of oppor-
tunities and ideas in the society. In this context, we are used to think of the
effects of people’s choices and actions on diffusion processes, like viral market-
ing campaigns or the launch of new technologies that increase online contacts.
In general, our focus is on what happens when each individual in the society
takes autonomous decisions that affect her socialization. Looking at people’s
responses and decisions can be helpful to design policies against diseases and to
understand how they affect the behavior of other members of the society.
∗We thank Alberto Dalmazzo, Matthew Jackson and Alessia Melegaro for very helpful
comments. We gratefully acknowledge funding from the Italian Ministry of Education Progetti
di Rilevante Interesse Nazionale (PRIN) grant 2017ELHNNJ.
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Following the outbreak of the new Coronavirus, governments have faced the
necessity to foster the limitation of social contacts. In most cases, initially the
population have been asked to limit their contacts relying on the individual
sense of responsibility (an extreme case was the initial approach in the United
Kingdom, where isolation was intended only for people suspected to be infected
or arrived from abroad, as stated by the Health Protection (Coronavirus) Reg-
ulations 2020 on March 10); while only at a later stage rigid temporary laws
have been issued (like China on January 23 and 26, 2020, or Italy on March
4 and 11). However, independently of the nature of the restrictions, it is clear
that not every individual responds in the same way to impositions and requests.
Some people cut immediately all their social contacts, while others may only
marginally reduce them. The classic argument of revealed preferences suggests
that those who have more social relations will be less prone to limit them: their
behavior reveals that they care more than others about social interactions, for
personal taste or for professional reasons. So, if we just ask people to reduce
their contacts at a level they feel safe, everybody will trade off the expected
risks with the benefit that they perceive from socialization. Thus, those who
have many contacts every day will be proportionally less inclined to cut them,
compared than those who have few.
Available data and public concern often focus on the number of contacts
that people have, with the obvious implication that a reduction in the average
number of contacts would correspond to a reduction in the infections. In this
note, we use an empirical analysis and a stylized model to show that, together
with the average number of contacts, other measures of statistical dispersion
– i.e. squared number of contacts (roughly, variance) – are also important to
explain the variation in the number of infections.
Empirical motivation
We conduct an exploratory analysis using the public dataset provided by Belot
and colleagues [1]. This dataset contains, among other information, survey data
on the individual number of contacts in the regions of six countries before and
after the interview, occurred in the third week of April 2020. The respondents to
the survey were asked the number of their contacts before the outbreak of Covid-
19 and in the last two weeks preceding the interview. We have then computed
the average number of contacts and average squared number of contacts at the
regional level.
We limit our analysis to the regions of Italy, South Korea and the United
Kingdom, because of the large impact of the coronavirus in these countries and
of the availability of data at a regional level. For each region, we have collected
the weekly number of cases and deaths before and after the survey interview
using the publicly available datasets listed in the Supporting Information.
Italy and South Korea displayed a similar timing in the diffusion of coro-
navirus as well as in government interventions, as shown by the government
response stringency index developed by Hale and colleagues [2]. For these two
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countries we have computed the weekly number of confirmed cases and deaths
in the week from March 1 to March 8 for the pre-interview period and in the
week from April 13 to April 20 for the post-interview period. Due to the later
diffusion of coronavirus in the UK, the weekly number of confirmed cases and
deaths is measured during the week from March 13 to March 20 and the week
from April 24 to May 1.1
We perform two ordinary least squares regressions where the dependent vari-
ables are the regional pre- and post-interview variation in the number of con-
firmed cases and deaths (respectively, ∆Confirmed Cases and ∆Deaths). The
number of contacts that an individual has is denoted by d, so that the (regional)
average number of contacts is denoted by 〈d〉 and the (regional) average squared
number of contact is 〈d2〉. The explanatory variables used in the regression are
the pre- and post-interview variation: ∆〈d〉 and ∆〈d2〉.
The estimates are shown in Table 1. Columns (1) and (2) report the esti-
mated effects on the variation in the number of confirmed cases while columns
(3) and (4) the estimated effects on the variation in the number of deaths. The
variation in the number of contacts, ∆〈d〉, always displays a negative effect sig-
nificantly different from zero on both dependent variables, as an obvious result
of the endogenous reaction to the spread of coronavirus.2 The variation in the
squared number of contacts, ∆〈d2〉, has a positive effect always statistically dif-
ferent from zero at 5% significance level. The inclusion of the latter regressor
always improves the adjusted R2, thus indicating that this variables has a great
explanatory power.3
SI–type model
In this section, we build a stylized model to argue that when a disease spreads in
a population with heterogeneous intensity of meetings – a so-called complex net-
work – if the individuals who meet many people exhibit high resistance against
isolation policies, such policies may not only turn out to be ineffective, but can
even be detrimental. Imagine a social-distancing policy that asks people to limit
their contacts to reduce the diffusion of a disease. This generates a new reduced
social network that is smaller but denser. The main unintended negative con-
sequence of the policy could be that even if the disease was eventually going to
die out in the original social network, it becomes endemic in the new network
instead. Paradoxically, as long as the policy is in force, the disease will be kept
alive.
The intuition behind the phenomenon is simple to grasp, and we leave the
details of a parsimonious susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) model in the
Supporting Information. Consider the social network of a society, where some
1In the UK, the indexes on the diffusion of Covid-19 are reported on a weekly basis, starting
on Fridays.
2This is because causality in the real data goes in both directions, and the larger is the
diffusion of the virus, the larger is the average reduction in contacts.
3In the Supporting Information we also test the presence of non-linear effects including as
a regressor the variation in the square of the average number of contacts.
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Table 1. Variations in confirmed cases and deaths
∆ Confirmed Cases ∆ Deaths
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆〈d〉 -69.228*** -167.411*** -25.549*** -50.594***
(21.289) (51.019) (8.300) (14.582)
∆〈d2〉 0.382** 0.097**
(0.172) (0.044)
Constant 213.419** 163.936 92.514*** 79.892**
(102.497) (113.241) (33.942) (33.278)
N. obs. 48 48 48 48
Adj. R2 0.100 0.231 0.158 0.245
Note: In columns 1 and 2 the dependent variable is the variation in the numbers
of confirmed cases in a region. In columns 3 and 4 the dependent variable is
the variation in the number of deaths in each region. ∆〈d〉 is the variation in
the average number of contacts in each region. ∆〈d2〉 is the variation in the
average squared number of contacts in each region. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
people have few links and others have many. Consider, also, a disease spreading
via these contacts. Whether the disease will be endemic or not turns out to
depend on the interplay between the features of the disease itself and the statis-
tical properties of the social network through which it is spreading. The disease
is concisely described by the transmission rate, β, and the recovery rate, δ. The
characteristics of the social network are captured by the number of contacts
that one has d. In particular, by its average across people, denoted 〈d〉, and by
the expected square of this number, 〈d2〉.
Whether the disease dies out or remains endemic depends on the relationship
between two quantities:
λ =
β
δ
and µ =
〈d〉
〈d2〉 .
A high λ indicates a disease that is highly contagious and slow to recover from.
On the contrary, µ describes the heterogeneity of the network. The analysis of
the model shows that µ captures how much the structure of the network slows
diffusion processes down: the lower the µ, the more dangerous the situation is
(with a physics analogy, 1/µ can be though of as the conductivity of the network
with respect to the disease’s diffusion process). When λ < µ the disease is not
endemic, and the difference between them tells us how fast it will die out.
Instead, when λ ≥ µ, the disease becomes endemic.
Social distancing policies aim at reducing the contacts among people, thus
modifying the original social network in order to cut or interrupt the transmis-
sion chain of the disease, until it dies out. However, if not everyone responds
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Original social network
h = 5
h = 3
h = 10
Fig 1. A social network of 500 nodes This is a social network with degree
distribution given by P(5) = P(10) = 0.4, P(20) = 0.1, P(40) = P(50) = 0.05.
Different self-isolation measures are applied, depending on the number h of links
removed to each node. In this example µ falls down as h increases.
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in the same way to the policy, then the resulting network may turn out to be
sparser on average, but still too dense of contacts among the most active in-
dividuals. This can happen, for instance, if those who have more contacts are
relatively less responsive to the policy indications. Unfortunately, then, the new
smaller network might have some properties, such as a low µ, that might hinder
the containment of the disease or even “help” the disease to remain endemic
among those individuals who keep on being active.
Imagine, for example, that the number of people that one meets on a daily
basis ranges from five to 50. As usually happens in the real world (see Fig
1), many people have few connections while few individuals, called hubs, have
a lot more. Now, say that everybody is asked to cut their meetings by the
same quantity (to begin with, just three contacts, which is more than half for
peripheral nodes, but proportionally very little for the hubs), so that the new
degree distribution is shifted down, but keeps the same variance. In this case,
a µ that was originally higher than λ may actually decrease, so that a disease
may remain active for more time. If more contacts are dropped with the same
uniform rule, µ may keep decreasing, up to the point that it becomes smaller
than λ, and the disease remains endemic in the society, at least as long as the
population is in the new network exhibits µ < λ. This remains true even if
an additional cut completely isolates some nodes in the network, or even most
of them. The sub–population of the remaining ones, those who had originally
many links and are still very connected, will behave as an incubator for the
disease because they form now a denser sub–network.
By contrast, a policy that imposes a proportional cut their contacts to each
individual always delivers an increased µ (e.g. it doubles if the reduction is by
50% for all nodes).
Conclusion
In this note, we argue that a valid social-distancing intervention by the au-
thorities should play on both the uniform scaling that reduces contacts by a
constant amount (as is the effect of closing schools for students) and on target-
ing those individuals with many contacts (which could be obtained by closing
or regulating private activities like shops and leisure meeting points).
Our claim is based on a simple SIS model (see Supporting Information) and
consistent with the empirical analysis shown in Table 1. It is also in line with
other models that have been recently proposed, as in the examples from the
Stanford Human Evolutionary Ecology and Health group or the SIR models
by Anderson and colleagues [3] and Koo and colleagues [4]. The same message
comes from the empirical work of Chinazzi and colleagues [5], analyzing human
mobility data from airline companies. All these works point out that restrictions
are effective only if everyone fulfills the prescriptions and limits socialization.
Several issues are not dealt with here, such as mental health consequences
of the imposed isolation [6, 7, 8] and the impact on the capacity of the health
systems, because the specific focus of this work is on proposing more efficient
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social-distancing policies. To do so, we highlight the importance of distinguish-
ing people by their degree of socialization, and remark that if not everybody
reduces drastically and proportionally their social contacts, then such measures
could have an effect opposite to the one expected.
Contributors Both AM and PP were responsible for analyzing the model and
writing the manuscript. TR was responsible for analyzing the data and writing
the manuscript.
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A Supporting Information
A.1 Empirical Analysis
In this section we describe how we collected the data used for the empirical
analysis, which are of two types: data on the number of contacts and data on
the number of confirmed cases and deaths.
A.1.1 Data on number of contacts
The data on regional average number of contacts and their variance are con-
structed using the public dataset provided by Belot and colleagues [1]. This
survey contains question on the number of contacts “on a typical working day
(before the outbreak of Covid-19)” and “on a typical day in the last 2 weeks”.
The total number of contacts of each individual has been constructed using the
number of contacts for more than 15 minutes with any person (children, adult
or elderly people). The variables used are listed in Table 2 and some descriptive
statistics are shown in Table 3.
Table 2. Variables used from survey
contacts before outbreak contacts in last 2 weeks before interview
close workint more child close recentint more child
close workint more adult close recentint more adult
close workint more elder close recentint more elder
We have dropped 3 outliers (out of 13,023 observations in the Italian, British
and South Korean regions) that is individuals with more than 800 contacts, in
the pre- and post-outbreak period. Notice that 800 corresponds to twenty times
the 95th percentile and more than 5 times the 99th percentile of the distribution
contacts in the pre-outbreak period.
A.1.2 Data on number of cases and deaths
Information on number of confirmed cases and number of death has been col-
lected from publicly available datasets. Some descriptive statistics are shown in
Table 3.
• Data for Italy and South Korea are collected as follows.
– Information for Italian regions (confirmed cases and deaths) are pro-
vided by Protezione Civile and available at COVID-19 Italia - Mon-
itoraggio situazione.
– Information for South Korean regions (confirmed cases and deaths)
are available at Data Science for COVID-19 (DS4C).
– For both Italian and South Korean regions, the weekly number of
confirmed cases and deaths (1-8 March, 13-29 April) have been com-
puted from the corresponding daily cumulative numbers.
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• Data for the United Kingdom are collected as follows.
– Data on the number of deaths for Wales and the regions of England
are provided on a weekly basis (from Friday to Friday) and available
from the Office for National Statistics.
– Data on the cumulative daily number of cases in the regions of Eng-
land are available at Coronavirus (COVID-19) in the UK. The weekly
number of cases is computed from the cumulative daily cases for the
week 13-20 March and the week from April 24 to May 1, to have this
measure on the same time window used by death weekly data.
– Weekly data on confirmed cases for Wales are computed from daily
data and are available at Public Health Wales Health Protection.
– Weekly data on deaths and cases for Northern Ireland are computed
from cumulative daily data and are available at Northern Ireland
Department of Health coronavirus information.
– Weekly data on deaths and cases for Scotland are computed from
cumulative daily data and are available at Scottish Government coro-
navirus information.
Table 3. Descriptive statistics
Pre-outbreak Post-outbreak ∆
(last 2 weeks before interview) (difference post-pre)
Confirmed Cases 299.625 812.188 512.563
(648.974) (1244.210) (1005.220)
Deaths 9.875 212.792 202.917
(35.830) (328.062) (305.180)
〈d〉 8.270 3.949 -4.321
(4.991) (2.400) (5.006)
〈d2〉 1175.600 194.638 -980.962
(1747.951) (361.876) (1629.347)
N. obs. 48 48 48
Mean and standard deviation (in parantheses) of the variables for the 48 regions in the
sample. 〈d〉 is the average number of contacts in each region. 〈d2〉 is the average squared
number of contacts in each region.
In Fig 2 we plot the pairwise relations among the variables used for the
empirical analysis, for the countries considered (Italy, South Korea and the
U.K.), where each point is a region of a country. These plots show the high
variability in these variables, even if the three countries have been hit by Covid19
in the same period.
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Fig 2. Pairwise relations among the variables considered
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A.1.3 Robustness check
In Table 4 we investigate the presence on a non-linear relation between the the
number of cases and deaths and the average number of contacts. The inclusion
of the square of the average number of contact does not alter the qualitative
impact of ∆〈d2〉 nor its statistical significance.
Table 4. Variations in cases and deaths
∆ Confirmed Cases ∆ Deaths
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆〈d〉 -67.945 -67.599 -27.361 -27.275
(64.513) (61.189) (19.401) (19.083)
∆〈d〉2 -0.067 -7.971* 0.094 -1.862
(3.113) (4.429) (1.148) (1.328)
∆〈d2〉 0.588** 0.146***
(0.219) (0.048)
Constant 214.174** 227.193** 91.448*** 94.671***
(89.785) (98.383) (31.568) (32.896)
N. obs. 48 48 48 48
Adj. R2 0.080 0.297 0.139 0.278
Note: In columns 1 to 2 the dependent variable is the variation in the
numbers of confirmed cases in a region. In columns 3 to 4 the dependent
variable is the variation in the number of deaths in each region. ∆〈d〉 is
the variation in the average number of contacts in each region. ∆〈d2〉 is the
variation in the average squared number of contacts in each region. ∆〈d〉2
is the variation in the square of average number of contacts in each region.
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
A.2 The model
Consider a society formed by a large number of individuals who interact by
meeting others at random and where each individual can alternate between
being susceptible or infected to a disease which transmits via social contacts.
More in detail, we first consider a degree-based random mixing model with an
infinite number of agents, often thought as an “approximation” of a large social
network. Then, we consider a tractable first approximation of a susceptible-
infected-susceptible (SIS) model based on a simple linear form, standard in the
literature [9, 10]. Although we are not the first ones to consider this model
in a context of quarantine, all previous works have focused on different issues
and did not consider the possible negative effects of a quarantine that is not
homogeneous [11, 12, 13]. Technically, we adopt a SIS model because its ergodic
12
nature delivers neat analytical results. Moreover, it is still not clear to scientists
whether Covid-19 can affect more than once the same person. Cases of multiple
infection in the same person have been reported by the end of February in China
and Japan.
Consider a network with degree distribution P (d), i.e. where the degree
of a node i is di and P (d) is the fraction of individuals with degree d. The
probability of meeting an agent of degree d is P (d)d/〈d〉. Let ρ(d) be the fraction
of individuals of degree d who are currently infected, so that the probability of
meeting an infected agent of degree d is
ρ(d)
P (d)d
〈d〉 .
Overall, the probability of meeting an infected individual is
θ =
∑
d
ρ(d)
P (d)d
〈d〉 , (1)
while the average infection rate in the population is ρ =
∑
d ρ(d)P (d).
The mechanism of the disease transmission is as follows. The chance that a
given individual of degree d becomes infected in a given period when faced with
a probability θ that any given meeting is with an infected individual is
βθd,
where β ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter describing the rate of transmission of the in-
fection in a given period. The probability that an infected individual recovers
(and becomes again susceptible) in a given period is δ ∈ (0, 1).
With a mean-field approach, one can compute the expected change of ρ(d)
over time, for all d
dρ(d)
dt
= (1− ρ(d))βθd− ρ(d)δ, (2)
where the first term describes the inflow of susceptibles becoming infected and
the second term describing the outflow, i.e. infected who recover.
The steady-state of the system is such that dρ(d)/dt = 0. Solving this
equation yields
ρ(d) =
λθd
λθd+ 1
, (3)
where λ := β/δ. Plugging Eq. (3) into Eq. (1) gives the condition
θ =
1
〈d〉
∑
d
λθd2P (d)
λθd+ 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:H(θ)
. (4)
The function H(θ) keeps track of how many individuals would become infected
starting from a level θ. Steady states of the system are fixed points such that
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H(θ) = θ and Eq. (4) has always solution θ = 0, but can also have other
solutions. Since H(0) = 0 and H(θ) is increasing and strictly concave in θ, then
it turns out that in order to have a (unique) positive steady state it must be
that H ′(θ) > 1. Since H ′(θ) = λ〈d2〉/〈d〉, then the condition for an endemic
equilibrium to exist is (and corresponding also to a positive average infection
rate in the population, ρ > 0)
λ >
〈d〉
〈d2〉︸︷︷︸
=:µ
. (5)
This condition means that the infection-to-recovery ratio has to be high enough
relative to average degree divided by second moment (roughly variance of degree
distribution). Intuitively, this shows that high degree nodes are more prone to
infection and, since they have many meeting, also serve as conduits for infection.
In general, a social network with high variance in the degree distribution is such
that there are many of such high degree nodes.
A.2.1 Endemic Disease from Self-isolation
From Eq. (5), we have that if µ = 〈d〉/〈d2〉 decreases, then the epidemics can
become endemic. This can happen, for example, if during a self-isolation period
only the nodes with low degree reduce drastically their contacts.
In general, consider the situation in which all nodes decrease their contacts
by a common discrete number h, obtaining a new re-scaled degree distribution
dˆ = d − h. The mean degree becomes 〈dˆ〉 = 〈d〉 − h, but the variance of the
degree distribution 〈dˆ2〉 − 〈dˆ〉2 = 〈d2〉 − 〈d〉2 remains unchanged. However, this
new distribution is such that the threshold 〈dˆ〉/〈dˆ2〉 in Eq. (5) is:
〈d− h〉
〈(d− h)2〉 =
〈d〉 − h
〈d2〉 − 2h〈d〉+ h2︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:µ(h)
.
Since
dµ
dh
∣∣∣
h=0
=
−〈d2〉+ 2〈d〉2
〈d2〉2 ,
then it is negative when 〈d2〉 > 2〈d〉2, which holds if the standard deviation is
high enough. For h small, this marginal effect remains negative which indicates
that µ(h) decreases. Specifically, as h increases then µ(h) decreases as long as
h does not exceed
2〈d〉 − 〈d
2〉
〈d〉 .
This implies that if the cut to links imposed by the self-isolation policy is too
weak, i.e. h is too small, then the threshold for the existence of the endemic
equilibrium decreases. Thus, a disease that was not endemic may instead be-
come endemic.
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A.2.2 Speed of Recovery to Disease-free Equilibrium
From Eq. (2) we can compute the Jacobian J when the disease is not endemic.
That is, when ρ(d) → 0 for all d, and also θ → 0. Deriving Eq. (2) with ρ = 0
and θ = 0 yields
Jk` =
{
β
〈d〉k
2P (k)− δ, if k = `,
β
〈d〉k`P (`), if k 6= `,
which can be written as the (D × D)-matrix J = (Jk`)k,`=1,...,D of the form
(where D is the maximum degree in the network)
J =
β
〈d〉

1
...
k
...
D

(
1P (1) · · · `P (`) · · ·DP (D))− δI,
where in the first term there is the matrix multiplication between two vectors
and I is the identity matrix.
In general, consider a matrix A := uv′−δI. Then, its eigenvalues are −δ and
v′u− δ. The corresponding eigenvectors are, respectively, all vectors orthogonal
to v and u itself. In our case, then, the only eigenvalues of J are
e1 = −δ and e2 = β 〈d
2〉
〈d〉 − δ ≡
β
µ
− δ.
While e1 = −δ is independent of the network and always negative, e2, which
is proportional to the difference 1/µ − 1/λ, is negative if and only if λ < µ.
From Eq. (5), this occurs exactly when the only equilibrium is the disease-free
equilibrium and it is asymptotically stable.
Moreover, from the policy perspective, in this case the speed of convergence
to the disease-free equilibrium is determined by
|e2| = δ − β
µ
.
This implies that as µ = 〈d〉/〈d2〉 increases, so does |e2| and the speed of con-
vergence to the disease-free equilibrium increases as well. Conversely, as µ
decreases, so does the speed of convergence, up to the point where µ goes below
the threshold λ in Eq. (5), which is when the equilibrium becomes endemic.
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